As one of the most serious types of cyber attack, Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) have caused major concerns on a global scale. APT refers to a persistent, multi-stage attack with the intention to compromise the system and gain information from the targeted system, which has the potential to cause significant damage and substantial financial loss. The accurate detection and prediction of APT is an ongoing challenge. This work proposes a novel machine learning-based system entitled MLAPT, which can accurately and rapidly detect and predict APT attacks in a systematic way. The MLAPT runs through three main phases: (1) Threat detection, in which eight methods have been developed to detect different techniques used during the various APT steps. The implementation and validation of these methods with real traffic is a significant contribution to the current body of research; (2) Alert correlation, in which a correlation framework is designed to link the outputs of the detection methods, aims to identify alerts that could be related and belong to a single APT scenario; and (3) Attack prediction, in which a machine learning-based prediction module is proposed based on the correlation framework output, to be used by the network security team to determine the probability of the early alerts to develop a complete APT attack. MLAPT is experimentally evaluated and the presented system is able to predict APT in its early steps with a prediction accuracy of 84.8%.
Introduction
The volume, complexity and variety of Cyber attacks are continually increasing. This trend is currently being driven by cyber warfare and the emergence of the Internet of Things [1] [2] [3] . The annual cost of cyber attacks was $3 trillion in 2015 and it is expected to increase to more than $6 trillion per annum by for the investments in intrusion detection and prevention systems [13] . APTs are currently one of the most serious threats to companies and governments [14] .
Most of the research in the area of APT detection, has focused on analysing already identified APTs [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] , or detecting a particular APT that uses a High false positives C&C-based [27] Considers the access to the C&C domains independent while the access to the legal domain is correlated
Can be easily evaded when the infected hosts connect to the c&C domains while users are surfing the Internet Spear-phishingbased [28] Uses "Tokens" and utilises mathematical and computational analysis to filter spam emails
The spear phishing email may not contain any of the Tokens -Detects only one step of APT life cycle
Statistical APT detector [29] The generated events in each APT step are correlated in a statistical manner Requires significant expert knowledge to set up and maintain
Active-learningbased [30] Detects malicious PDFs based on white lists and their compatibility as viable
PDF files
Detects only one step of APT life cycle
Data Leakage Prevention [31] Utilises DLP algorithm to detect the step of data exfiltration
Detects only one step of APT life cycle -Cannot achieve real time detection CCI sensors can provide the required information regarding the leaked data fingerprints. This approach also introduces privacy issues, whereby actors in the CCI have access to the data stored and transfered by all users of the sytems.
A working prototype, SPuNge, is presented in [23] . The proposed approach determined. This system depends on detecting one activity of the APT attack, which is malicious URL connection, and does not consider the other activities of APT. Meaning, if the detection system misses the malicious URL connection, the whole APT scenario will not be detected. Additionally, the system cannot achieve real time detection.
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A context-based framework for APT detection is explained in [32] . This framework is based on modelling APT as an attack pyramid in which the top of the pyramid represents the attack goal, and the lateral planes indicates the environments involved in the APT life cycle. This detection framework requires significant expert knowledge to set up and maintain.
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Finally, the existing APT detection systems face serious shortcomings in achieving real time detection, balance between false positive and false negative rates and correlating of events spanning over a long period of time. To address those weaknesses, this paper presents a new approach for APT detection and prediction. 
Design Rationale
APTs are multi-step attacks, therefore effective detection should go through the detection of the techniques used within each stage of the APT life cycle.
155
Detection modules should be developed to detect the most common techniques used in the APT attack steps.
However, detecting a single stage of an APT technique itself does not mean detecting an APT attack. Even though an individual module alert indicates a technique which can possibly be used in an APT attack, this technique can be 160 used for other types of attacks or it can be even a benign one. For example, domain flux, port scanning and malicious C&C communications, used in the APT attack, can be also used for botnet attacks [33] . Moreover, Tor network connection, used for data exfiltration in the APT attack, can also be used legally to protect the confidentiality of a user traffic [34] . Thus, individually these 165 detection modules are ineffective and their information should be fused to build a complete picture regarding an APT attack. For this reason, a correlation framework should be developed to link the outputs of the detection modules and reduce the false positive rate of the detection system.
Predicting the APT attack in its early steps would minimise the damage and 170 prevent the attacker from achieving the goal of data exfiltration. With a historical record of the correlation framework output, machine learning algorithms can be used to train a prediction model. As the purpose of the prediction model is to classify the early alerts of the correlation framework, classification algorithms should be selected to train the model. 
MLAPT Architecture
Based on the design rationale, the architecture of the proposed system (MLAPT) is shown in Figure 1 . The MLAPT runs through three main phases:
threat detection, alert correlation and attack prediction.
Initially, the network traffic is scanned and processed to detect possible tech-180 niques used in the APT life cycle. To this end, eight detection modules have been developed; each module implements a method to detect one technique used in one of APT attack steps, and it is independent from the other modules.
MLAPT implemented eight modules, presented later in Section 3. of this phase are alerts, also known as events, triggered by individual modules.
The alerts raised by individual detection modules are then fed to the correlation framework. The aim of the correlation framework is to find alerts could be related and belong to one APT attack scenario. The process in this phase undergoes three main steps: alerts filter to identify redundant or repeated alerts;
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clustering of alerts which most likely belong to the same APT attack scenario;
and correlation indexing to evaluate the degree of correlation between alerts of each cluster.
In the final phase, a machine-learning-based prediction module is used by the network security team to determine the probability of the early alerts to 195 develop a complete APT attack. This allows the network security team to predict the APT attack in its early steps and apply the required procedure to stop it before completion and minimize the damage. The detection of APT is different from the prediction. The detection can be when two or more steps of APT are correlated. However, the prediction can be achieved after the first two 200 steps of APT are linked.
The detection modules have been presented in [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] , this paper focuses on the correlation framework and prediction module.
MLAPT Detection Modules
Taking into consideration the APT steps, Table 2 shows the MLAPT detec-205 tion modules for each APT step. These modules are: 
APT step Detection modules
Step 1
Intelligence gathering
This initial step includes a passive process which cannot be detected through network traffic monitoring, so there are no detection modules.
Step 2
Point of entry
Disguised exe file detection
Malicious file hash detection
Malicious domain name detection
Step 3
C&C communication

Malicious IP address detection
Malicious SSL certificate detection Domain flux detection
Step 4
Lateral movement This is internal traffic within the target's network. MLAPT monitors the inbound and outbound traffic, so there are no detection modules.
Step 5
Asset/Data discovery Scanning detection
Step 6
Data exfiltration
Tor connection detection Scan Detection (SD): The SD module detects port scanning attacks which aims to identify the noteworthy servers and services for future data exploitation.
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SD is based on tracking all failed connection attempts, and a threshold for those failed attempts is imposed over a specific time interval to detect scanning attacks and identify infected hosts [41] .
Tor Connection Detection (TorCD): This module detects any connection to a Tor network. It is based on a list of Tor servers which is publicly published.
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The network traffic is processed and the source and destination IP addresses for each connection are matched with Tor servers list [42] .
FCI Correlation Framework
This phase of MLAPT takes the output of each of the detection modules (the generated alerts) as an input, and aims to find alerts could be correlated and 255 belong to a single APT attack scenario. FCI (Filter, Cluster, and Index) runs through three main steps: (1) Alerts filter, which filters redundant or repeated alerts; (2) Alerts clustering, which clusters alerts which potentially belong to the same APT attack scenario; and (3) Correlation indexing, which evaluates the correlations between alerts of each cluster.
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In Section 3.3, eight attack detection modules are presented, each module detects one possible technique used in one of the APT steps. The output of each module is an alert which is generated when an attack is detected. Each alert has seven attributes (alert_type, timestamp, src_ip, src_port, dest_ip, dest_port, infected_host). Table 3 summarizes the steps of the APT attack that can be 265 detected by MLAPT and the alerts which can be generated for each step.
All alerts generated by the detection modules are fed to the correlation 
APT step Alerts
(A)
Step 2 Point of entry
Step 6 Data exfiltration (d1) tor_alert framework. However, those alerts are not the only ones detected by the the modules. When an APT technique is detected, and before an alert is generated, the module checks whether the same alert has been generated during the 270 previous day, if so, the alert is ignored. This alerts suppression reduces the computational cost of the FCI correlation framework. The FCI process steps will be explained in this section. As an output of the FCI correlation framework, two main alerts can be generated:
• apt_full_scenario_alert: This alert is generated when FCI detects a full
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APT attack scenario during a specific time window, called the correlation time. This is the period in which APT is expected to complete its life cycle. A full attack scenario is one in which all possible detectable steps of an APT are detected by FCI. In other words, FCI detects four correlated steps of an APT, i.e. four different alerts each one is from a different step.
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Based on Table 3 , and taking into consideration the APT life cycle, FCI is able to detect nine possible full scenarios of APT (APT-full). These possible full APT scenarios can be expressed as:
• apt_sub_scenario_alert: This alert is generated when FCI detects two 285 or three, rather than all, correlated steps of an APT attack during a specific time window. In this partial attack detection scenario, alerts from one or two steps were not generated. Thus, FCI can generate two types of this alert: apt_sub_scenario_two_steps_alert; and apt_sub_scenario_three_steps_alert. FCI is able to detect forty six pos-290 sible APT sub-scenarios which can be expressed as:
Alerts Filter (AF)
The first module of the FCI correlation framework filters redundant or repeated alerts. The AF module takes all alerts generated by the various detection modules as an input. For each new generated alert, the alerts filter checks if the 295 alert has been generated during the correlation time window. If the new alert is the same type and has the same attributes of a recorded one, then the new alert is ignored. This filtering module reduces computational cost of the FCI correlation framework.
Alerts Clustering (AC)
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This module clusters alerts which most likely belong to the same APT attack scenario. One cluster can represent a possible APT full or sub-scenario, i.e. it can contain one, two, three or four different alerts; each alert for a different APT step. The AC module takes the AF output, all alerts generated by the detection modules after repeated ones are filtered, as an input. All incoming alerts are 305 stored by AC for a correlation time. For each new alert, the AC module checks all stored alerts for the clustering possibility. The clustering algorithm in this module is scenario-based, which utilizes three main rules:
• Alert step: Alerts for the same APT attack step cannot be in one cluster.
• Alert type: Alerts of the same type cannot be in one cluster.
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• Alert time: Cluster's alerts should be all triggered within the correlation time, and alerts order should be corresponded with the APT life cycle.
Meaning, if t(d), t(c), t(b)
and t(a) are the times when the alerts from the APT steps six, five, three and two, respectively, have been triggered, the clustering algorithm can classify those alerts into one cluster only if they 315 meet the following two conditions:
( a ) <= C o r r e l a t i o n _ t i m e
The AC module has four processing engines, explained later in Section 4.2.2 on page 20, each engine processes all alerts which belong to one of the APT 320 detectable steps. Based on the incoming alert step, a corresponded engine runs.
As a result of AC process, the new incoming alert can be classified into an existing APT cluster, a new APT cluster can be created, or the new alert is ignored as it does not meet the rules and cannot be clustered at all. The output of AC is APT clusters. Each cluster contains a maximum of four alerts, which 325 potentially belong to one APT full or sub-scenario. The produced cluster alerts are evaluated using the correlation index algorithm, presented in the following Section 3.4.3 on page 15, to decide if they are correlated or not.
Correlation Indexing (CI)
The third processing module evaluates the correlations between alerts in 330 each cluster to determine if they belong to a full or sub APT attack scenario.
This module has two major functions. The first function is to evaluate the correlations between alerts when building the cluster. of each alert in the cluster, the CI algorithm utilizes the following rules:
When equals to 1, this means there is a correlation between the second step and the third step of APT and the corresponding alerts can be in one cluster. When equals to 0, there is no correlation and the two alerts cannot be in one cluster. And so on for and .
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The CI algorithm calculates the cluster's correlation index using the following equation:
Since , and values can be only 1 or 0, the cluster's correlation index is always positive and can take one of the following values:
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• 0; there is no correlation between any of the cluster's alerts, and the cluster's alerts cannot belong to one APT attack scenario.
• 1; there is a correlation between two different steps of an APT attack, and the cluster's alerts belong to one APT sub-scenario "apt_sub_scenario_two_steps".
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• 2; there is a correlation between three different steps of an APT attack, and the cluster's alerts belong to one APT sub-scenario "apt_sub_scenario_three_steps".
• 3; there is a correlation between four different steps (all detectable steps)
of an APT attack, and the cluster's alerts belong to one APT full scenario
All the clusters and their correlation index values are recorded into a specific dataset, the correlation_dataset, to be used in the Prediction module.
Prediction Module (PM)
This module is used by the network security team to estimate the probability 375 of an apt_sub_scenario_two_steps_alert, generated by the FCI correlation framework, to develop a complete APT attack. In practical terms, it predicts if FCI will generate an apt_full_scenario_alert in the future based on the attributes of the current apt_sub_scenario_alert. This prediction gives the network security team a sign to perform more forensics on the corresponding 380 two suspicious connections and deny the attacker to complete the APT life cycle.
The prediction module uses a historical record of the monitored network and applies machine learning techniques to achieve its functionality. 
MLAPT Implementation
In this section, the implementation of MLAPT are introduced and the used frameworks, tools and programming languages are mentioned. As MLAPT con-sists of three main phases: threat detection, alert correlation and attack predic-tion; the implementation algorithms of each phase are presented separately.
Implementation of the Detection Modules
All detection modules are implemented on top of Bro [43]. The implementation and evaluation of the detection modules have been published in [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] .
Therefore, this paper presents only the implementation and evaluation of the 405 correlation framework and prediction module.
As an output of each detection module, in case of an APT technique is detected, a corresponding event (alert) is generated. This event is to be used in 
Implementation of the FCI Correlation Framework
The FCI framework is implemented in two versions. The first one is implemented on top of Bro to be used on live traffic for real time detection; it can be also used offline on PCAP (Packet Capture) files. The second version is implemented in Python to be used offline on saved alerts' logs. Using FCI 425 offline-version is useful when having a PCAP file for a network which is not monitored by Bro.
Implementation of the Alerts Filter (AF) Module
When generating a new alert by one of the detection modules, the AF algorithm checks t_detection_modules_alerts 
Implementation of the Alerts Clustering (AC) Module
All produced APT clusters are recorded into a specific dataset, the clus-440 tered_dataset, to be consumed by the next module, namely the correlation indexing module. The clustering algorithm dataset "clustered_dataset" consists of clusters. Each cluster contains a maximum of four alerts and each alert represents one of the APT detectable steps:
First, the AC module determines to which one of the APT steps the new alert, coming from the AF module, belongs. MLAPT can detect four steps of the APT life cycle, mentioned in Section 3.4, Table 3 on page 13. Based on the new alert step, AC has four processing engines, each engine processes all alerts 460 which belong to one APT step.
For alert_1 processing engine, the second step of APT is the first detectable step, therefore, as soon as an alert of the second APT step is triggered, AC starts a new cluster and writes the new alert into alert_1.
For alert_2 processing engine, when a new alert for the third step of APT is and time -time_1 <= TW ; whereas TW stands for the time window "correlation time". Following this, the first function of the CI module checks the infected_host attributes: infected, the infected host of the current processed alert;
and infected_1, the infected host of alert_1. If both infected host attributes 475 are matched, the current processed alert is added into the current cluster of interest as alert_2. In addition, an event apt_sub_scenario_two_steps_alert is generated and an alert email is sent to RT informing the network security team regarding this APT sub scenario detection. When one of the previous checks fails, AC checks if the current cluster is the last one in the clustered_dataset:
480 if true, a new cluster is started and the current processed alerts is added as alert_2 ; if false, the process is to be repeated again for the next cluster.
For alert_3 processing engine, when a new alert for the fifth step of APT is triggered, AC checks all the clusters in the clustered_dataset. There are three cases for the cluster of interest: (1) when the cluster has alert_1 and alert_2
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and the other alerts "alert_3 and alert_4 " are missed; (2) when the cluster has alert_1 and the other alerts "alert_2, alert_3, alert_4 " are missed; (3) and when the cluster has alert_2 and the other alerts "alert_1, alert_3, alert_4 " are missed.
For the first case of cluster of interest, AC checks all time attributes which 490 should meet two conditions: time > time_2 and time -time_1 <= TW. Following this, CI checks all infected host attributes that should meet the condition infected == infected_2, as alert_1 and alert_2 are already in the cluster so it is guaranteed that infected_1 == infected_2 and there is no need for the first function of CI to check it. The current processed alert is then added into the current 495 cluster of interest as alert_3, an event apt_sub_scenario_three_steps_alert is generated, and an alert email is sent to RT informing the network security team regarding this APT sub-scenario detection. If one of the previous checks is failed, it is checked if the current cluster is the last one in clustered_dataset:
if true, a new cluster is started and the current processed alerts is added as 500 alert_3 ; if false, the process is to be repeated again for the next cluster.
For the second and third case of cluster of interest, the process is similar to the first case, taking into consideration the corresponded time and infected host attributes.
For alert_4 processing engine, the first step is to find the cluster of interest in 505 the clustered_dataset. When a new alert for the sixth step of APT is triggered, AC checks all the clusters in the clustered_dataset. There are seven cases for the cluster of interest: (1) when the cluster has alert_1, alert_2, and alert_3, and the last alert "alert_4 " is missed; (2) when the cluster has alert_1 and alert_2 and the other alerts "alert_3 and alert_4 " are missed; (3) when the 510 cluster has alert_1 and alert_3 and the other alerts "alert_2 and alert_4 " are missed; (4) when the cluster has alert_2 and alert_3 and the other alerts "alert_1 and alert_4 " are missed; (5) when the cluster has alert_1 and the other alerts "alert_2, alert_3, and alert_4 " are missed; (6) when the cluster has alert_2 and the other alerts "alert_1, alert_3, and alert_4 " are missed; 515 (7) and when the cluster has alert_3 and the other alerts "alert_1, alert_2, and alert_4 " are missed.
The process of all cases of cluster of interest in alert_4 processing engine is similar to the process in alert_3 processing engine explained above. The AC algorithm checks all time attributes of the cluster; after that, the CI algo-520 rithm checks all infected host and scanned host attributes; to decide whether the current processed alert is to be added into the current cluster of interest as alert_4. Based on the cluster of interest, three events can be generated as an output of alert_4 processing engine: apt_full_scenario_alert for case 1; apt_sub_scenario_three_steps_alert for cases 2, 3, and 4; and 
Implementation of the Correlation Indexing (CI) Module
The first function of CI, evaluation the correlations between the cluster's alerts, is implemented within AC algorithm, as explained in the previous Sec- 
Implementation of the Prediction Module (PM)
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The PM module uses machine learning techniques to achieve its function- 
Preparing the Machine Learning Dataset
Building the machine_learning_dataset is based on the correlation_dataset, which is the output of the FCI correlation framework over a period of six months or more. The correlation_dataset contains the correlated clusters, both full and sub APT scenarios, and the correlation index for each cluster. To prepare 550 the machine_learning_dataset, PM makes the following modifications on the correlation_dataset:
• The prediction of apt_sub_scenario_two_steps_alert to complete the APT life cycle is based on the first two detectable steps of APT, therefore, only the clusters containing at least alerts for the first two detectable 555 steps, i.e. alert_1 and alert_2, are kept; the other clusters are filtered out of the correlation_dataset.
• Based on the value, the correlation_dataset clusters can be classified into four classes: class 3, for APT full scenario and the cluster has four correlated alerts; class 2, for APT sub-scenario and the cluster has 560 three correlated alerts; class 1, for APT sub-scenario and the cluster has two correlated alerts; and class 0, the cluster has only one alert. The machine_learning_dataset contains only two classes: class 1 for APT full scenario; and class 0, for uncompleted APT scenario. Thus, the PM module considers: (1) class 3, in the correlation_dataset, as class 1, for the 565 machine_learning_dataset; and (2) classes 2, 1, and 0, in the correlation_dataset, as class 0, for the machine_learning_dataset.
• The class prediction is based on the first two detectable steps of APT, therefore, all the columns related to the third and fourth detectable alerts, i.e. alert_3 and alert_4 attributes, are filtered out of the cor-570 relation_dataset.
• Since the chosen machine learning classifiers work with numeric values, columns which are not numeric in the correlation_dataset are represented in a numerical format for the machine_learning_dataset. The alert_type values are mapped to numbers from 1 to 6, and the columns which
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contain IPs values (src_ip_1, dest_ip_1, infected_host_1, src_ip_2, dest_ip_2, infected_host_2 ) are mapped to numeric values using socket [45] and struct.unpack [46] functions built in Python.
Training the Prediction Model
As the task is to predict classes, classification methods are chosen and differ- has the higher prediction accuracy, is chosen. The best model is saved to be used by the network security team.
Using the Model for Prediction
When a new apt_sub_scenario_two_steps_alert is generated by the correlation framework, the new data, i.e. the cluster attributes, is prepared as 590 explained above in Section 4.3.1 on page 24, then the prediction model, which has been trained and chosen in the previous step, is applied.
As a result, the network security team can determine the probability of the current alert to complete the APT life cycle, and apply the required procedure to stop the attack before completion and achieving the final aim of data 595 exfiltraition.
Experimental Evaluation of MLAPT
In this section, the evaluation of MLAPT is introduced and the achieved results are presented. As MLAPT consists of three main phases: threat detection, alert correlation and attack prediction; the evaluation of MLAPT undergoes the 600 evaluation of the three phases respectively. Additionally, a comparison between the developed system MLAPT and other existing systems is provided.
Evaluation of the Detection Modules
Two main methods were used to evaluate the detection modules. In the first one, the detection modules were applied on pcap files which contain malicious 605 traffic. Each pcap file was provided by a different third party, pcap file size and data source are mentioned in the evaluation section of each detection module.
In the second evaluation method, Bro was installed on an experimental server via an optical TAP (Test Access Port). The detection modules were run on the experimental server and the network was monitored for one month.
Evaluation of the FCI Correlation Framework
In the absence of any publicly available data which contains APT attack traffic, which can be used in the evaluation of the FCI framework. We had 615 to build a new dataset which contains APT attack traffic. Using the campus network to gather attack data does not guarantee capturing any APT attack traffic against the monitored network.
The aim of the correlation framework is to identify different alerts raised by the various detection modules, which could be correlated and belong to one 620 APT attack scenario. To effectively evaluate the FCI correlation framework, a dataset containing many of the detection modules alerts, in which some of those alerts belong to APT attack scenarios, has been built. The data is generated to appear as APT attack scenarios were simulated on the campus network, the techniques used in the APT life cycle were identified by the detection modules,
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and all generated alerts were written into the simulation dataset. That dataset also contains many of the generated alerts which do not belong to APT attack scenarios. All the detection modules have been evaluated on pcap files and on the real live traffic as well. The aim of this experiment is to test if the FCI correlation framework is able to detect those APT scenarios in the simulation 630 dataset.
Data Generation
A script is written, using Python. This script generates two types of alerts:
(1) Random alerts which do not relate or belong to one APT attack scenario; and (2) Related alerts which belong to a full or sub-APT attack. Each alert has seven 635 attributes: alert_type, timestamp, src_ip, src_port, dest_ip, dest_port and the infected_host; only the scan_alert has the extra scanned_host attribute.
To generate a random alert, the alert_type is selected randomly from the set of all 8 detectable alerts, i.e. disguised_exe_alert, hash_alert, domain_alert, ip_alert, ssl_alert, domain_flux_alert, scan_alert and tor_alert. The times- dress from the ip_blacklist; if alert_type is scan_alert, the dest_ip is selected randomly from campus network IP addresses; and if the alert_type is tor_alert, the dest_ip is selected randomly from tor_server_list. The dest_port is selected based on the selected alert_type: if the alert_type is disguise_exe_alert or hash_alert, the dest_port should be 80; if the alert_type is domain_alert or 655 domain_flux_alert, the dest_port should be 53; if the alert_type is ip_alert, ssl_alert or tor_alert, the dest_port should be 443; and if the alert_type is scan_alert, the dest_port is selected randomly from the 1, 1024 range of ports.
The infected_host should be the same src_ip of the connection. Finally, the scanned_host (only if alert_type is scan_alert) should be the same dest_ip of 660 the connection.
To generate an APT full-scenario (consisting of 4 correlated alerts) or subscenario (consisting of 2 or 3 correlated alerts), the APT life cycle should be taken into consideration. Meaning, the generated alerts' attributes of each scenario are selected to appear as an APT attack which is simulated through the 665 campus network.
Experimental Setup
To determine the number of random alerts to be generated for the simulation_dataset, the experimental server, previously mentioned in Section 5.1 on page 26, was used to monitor part of the university campus network. All detec-670 tion modules were run on the experimental server to analyse the network traffic;
the monitoring period and the number of detected alerts were determined. According to the actual university network size and the actual simulation_dataset monitoring period, the number of the generated random alerts was calculated.
The number of the generated APT full-and sub-scenarios should be suitable to 675 get enough samples for each class in the machine_learning_dataset previously explained in Section 4.3.1 on page 24.
The network monitoring was conducted via the experimental server for 2 weeks and 9 different alerts were detected by the detection modules. The size of the monitored network was 550 nodes, while the whole campus network is
Results and Discussion
The FCI correlation framework was applied on the simulation_dataset. Ta spectively. The results show that the higher the number of related alerts, the lower the TPR and the higher FPR. This is due to the higher possibility of the random alerts to be incorrectly clustered when more alerts are to be correlated for APT. By manual analysis for the results, the incorrect alerts clustering was the main reason of the false alarms. Some APT attacks were not detected due 700 to some of the random alerts which were incorrectly clustered and correlated.
This can happen if those random alerts, by chance, meet the clustered and correlation rules, so one random alert can interfere with a running APT scenario (if the random alert is triggered for the missed scenario step, for the same infected host, and within the correlation time) and cause the false positive detection of
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APT and false negative detection of the random alert. Besides, a very rare case can cause the wrong detection is when two, three or four random alerts can meet the correlation rules, by chance, and are correlated incorrectly. 
Evaluation of the APT Prediction Module (PM)
To evaluate the PM module, three main steps were followed: (1) Preparing 710 the machine_learning_dataset; (2) Training the prediction model; and (3) Saving the model for prediction.
Using the correlation_dataset, which is the output of the FCI correlation framework over a period of six months, the machine_learning_dataset is prepared as explained in Section 4.3.1 on page 24.
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As there is no machine learning algorithm which can be regarded as the best or the optimal one, various experiments should be performed on the machine_learning_dataset using several machine learning algorithms, and then a comparison between the trained models is made.
The Matlab's Classification Learner application is used to train models to 720 classify the machine_learning_dataset. Automated training is performed to search for the best classification model type, including decision trees, support vector machines, nearest neighbours, and ensemble classification; the characteristics of each classifier type can be found in [48] . Cross-validation is used as a validation scheme to examine the prediction accuracy of each trained model.
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Cross-validation is a model assessment technique used to evaluate a machine learning algorithm's performance in making predictions on new datasets which has not been trained on . This is done by partitioning a dataset and using a subset to train the algorithm and the remaining data for testing. Each round of cross-validation involves randomly partitioning the original dataset into a train-
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ing set and a testing set. The training set is then used to train a supervised learning algorithm and the testing set is used to evaluate its performance. This process is repeated several times and the average accuracy is used as a performance indicator. Table 5 shows the prediction accuracy for all investigated classification algorithms used to train the classification models.
735
Experimental results show that the best classification algorithm is the Linear SVM, with a prediction accuracy of 84.8%. This trained model can be saved by the network security team to be applied on real time traffic when a new real This section presents a performance analysis of four existing APT detection systems, and provides a comparison between the developed system MLAPT and these current systems, as shown in Table 6 . The most effective system in terms of true positive rate is TerminAPTor [26] with a TPR of 100%, previously mentioned in Section 2 on page 4. However, the developers mentioned that TerminAPTor has a high rate of false positives (although they did not mention the figure of FPR) and needs to be improved by filtering the false positives. Moreover, this detector requires the alerts to be 750 provided by other systems (agent-based) and cannot work autonomously. Despite having the lowest false positive rate of 0%, the C&C-based system [27] , presented previously in Section 2 on page 5, does not achieve the real time detection. Furthermore, the authors stated that the detection can be easily evaded when the infected hosts connect to the C&C domains while users are surfing the
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Internet. Additionally, missing the detection of C&C domains leads to failure in APT detection since this system depends on detecting only one step of the APT life cycle. Whilst the spear phishing based system [28] , explored earlier in Section 2 on page 6, has a TPR of 97.2%, the FPR of 14.2% is considerably high. In addition, depending on one step for APT detection leads the system to 760 fail when missing the spear phishing email detection. This missing can happen when the spear phishing email does not include any of the tokens which are necessary for the algorithm process. The context-based system [32] , already stated in Section 2 on page 7, has a significantly high FPR of 27.88% while the TPR was not provided by the authors. Besides, this framework requires significant expert knowledge to set up and maintain; and similar to TerminAPTor, it is an agent-based system and cannot work autonomously.
Having a high rate of true positives is significant. Nevertheless, increasing the amount of true positives means that the false positive rate also increases. Thus, the balance between TPR and FPR is an essential requirement for any detection in case one of the steps is missed. Furthermore, this system can achieve the real time detection, so it can be much easier to trace back to the attacker, minimise the damage and prevent further break-ins. Moreover, to the author's knowledge, MLAPT is the only system which can predict APT in its early steps with a prediction accuracy of 84.8%, which prevents the attacker from achieving 780 the goal of data exfiltration.
Conclusion and Future Work
The volume, sophistication, and variety of cyber attacks including APT attacks are increasing exponentially on a global scale. There is an urgent need to develop an efficient system for fast and accurate detection of attacks for quick 785 response and defense. This paper has developed a novel machine learning based system (MLAPT) to detect and predict APT attacks in a holistic approach.
The MLAPT consists of three main phases: threat detection, alert correlation and attack prediction. The contributions of the MLPT are
• In the alert correlation, we have developed correlation framework which 790 can link the alerts produced in the first phase with the APT attacks to ensure the reduction of false positive rate.
• In the final phase, a machine-learning-based prediction module (PM) is designed and implemented based on a historical record of the monitored network.
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• The proposed system is capable of accurately capture attacks in a timely fashion.
MLAPT is experimentally evaluated and its performance is compared against four of its most prominently cited rivals according to recent literature.
Evaluation results show that MLAPT balances the true positive rate and the 800 false positive rate with 81.8% and 4.5% respectively.
Some of the developed detection modules (i.e. the blacklist-based modules)
require a continuous update and may not work consistently. For future work, a number of improvements within the system could be made. First, it is suggested that more detection modules are added to detect other techniques used in the
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APT attack life cycle. Furthermore, if MLAPT were able to monitor the internal network traffic, other detection modules could be added to detect brute force and pass the hash attacks, increasing the detectable steps of the the system. Second, it is also recommended that more than one detection module for the same technique are developed. Third, it is advised that alerts from external
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IDSs deployed on the network are received and fed to MLAP, which can reduce the false positive rate of the system. Fourth, MLAP detection modules were evaluated on real traffic and pcap files contain real attacks. However, the FCI framework was validated on simulated data. Therefore, it would be beneficial to test MLAP on real APTs. Nevertheless, obtaining such data is not easy, and 815 the lack of relevant publicly available data sources was the main reason for using the synthetic data when evaluating the correlation framework.
